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Collective Action – a Challenge and an Opportunity for Water Governance 
 
 
 This paper addresses the motivations that drive participation in groups concerning water protection 
and provides a review of the key role collective action plays in accessing and managing water 
resources. It also analyzes the conditions and factors which make such organizations effective in 
solving shared problems and in faciliting and institutionalizing negotiation platforms.     
             
Collective action heavily relies on the social capital existing in a community to accomplish goals 
and objectives. These social networks allow for flow of information, serving not only to criticize 
but also to purpose a different course in environmental and particularly, water management.  
 
The  vital  role  of  collective  action  and  other  "major  groups"  in  sustainable  development  was 
recognized  in  Chapter  27[2]  of  Agenda  21,  leading  to  revised  arrangements  for  consultative 
relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations which are, indeed, 
collective voluntary action. 
 
The  coalition  building  capacity  suggesting  the  mobilization  of  civil  society  in  the  sense  of 
organized  interests  can  supplement  the  ultimate  responsibility  of  the  traditional  democratic 
institutions according to the implementation of the Aarthus Principles. 
 
 Modern governance calls for consensus, seeking processes with organized interests, a good culture 
of consultation and participation. Collective action meets these goals, as offers the chances for 
environmental  effectiveness,  contributing  to  information  generation  and  creation  of  relevant 
knowledge.  These  factors  may  relieve  the  legislator,  affecting  the  way  in  which  powers  are 
exercised at European level, particularly as regards the five principles of good governance, namely 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.  
 
Most problems with water resource management are felt at the lowest levels and changes in water 
management are required down to the individual action, reasons why the development strategies 
call for extensive pro-active  participation (at different levels, sectors and scales)  upholding the 
principles of subsidiarity. 
 
Finally, this paper also highlights the role performed by collective action in increasing advocacy 
skills and capacity, contributing to strengthening governance at the local level through favoring the 
enabling environment for water protection and conservation. 
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Ever since humans interact with environment in a world of change, but by the 
beginning of the 1950s the fear rose that physical limits, due to severe natural 
resources shortages,  could some day  be reached. Environmental problems have 
become  increasingly  apparent  and  attained  a  global  significance;  changes  turn 
more rapid and all-pervading than before.  
The increasing scarcity, population growth, ozone depletion, global warming, the 
threaten of water and air pollution leading to increased quality problems, toxic 
waste disposal, tropical forestation will create difficulties for the continuance of 
these  days  pattern  of  life  whose  quality  is  judged  by  the  quantity  of  goods 
produced and whose value is thought to be increased by the dissipation of our 
patrimony  of  natural  resources,  which  can  destroy  our  aspirations  for  a  more 
equitable and humane society.  
These problems need a coordinated and effective human response that is slow to 
rise  and  demand  that  humanity  live  ecologically  and  some  economic  and 
organizational problems be considered, in particular: how must be changed the 
path growth? What would be the economic characteristics of an environmentally 
sustainable system? What institutional changes would have that system? Would it 
permit improvements in the pattern of life? 
Scarce resources can be economized by the effective use of the price mechanism 
but  there  is  certain  resistance  to  sharp  increases  in  prices,  which  are  seen  as 
threatening accepted standards. Furthermore, where resources and the industries 
using them are privately owned, increased prices limiting their use are unlikely to 
be  imposed  with  agreement  or  voluntary.  However,  for  the  majority  of  those ERSA 2006 
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problems,  if  the  community  could  be  convinced  that  effective  control  was 
essential, the task is realizable. Generally, controls which are exercised through 
price  mechanisms  have  a  better  record  of  effectiveness  (Verbruggen,  1994; 
Kolstad, 2000; COM, 2000) but collective action may contribute decisively for 
helping governments to design policies for sustainable management and utilization 
of  natural  resources  for  the  present  and  future  generations,  mainly  concerning 
water resources management.  
Research on collective action theme is quite varied and reaches different subjects. 
To  refer  only  few  ones,  Western  and  Wright  (1994)  stresses  that  empirical 
evidence  shows  that  community  resource  management  can  increase  efficacy, 
legitimacy and sustainability of natural resources management. But as Zantel and 
Knuth  (2004)  point  out,  there  is  still  relatively  little  empirical  work  that  has 
analyzed  the  factors  that  determine  participation  in  community  resource 
management. Myatt and Wallace (2005) have a mathematical research concerning 
the  conditions  for  the  success  of  a  collective  action  and  Cabugueira  (2003) 
analyzes  voluntary  approaches  as  collective  actions,  while  Sandler(1992) 
formalizes and summarizes Olson(1971) theoretical development and Carraro and 
Lévêque (1999) investigate voluntary agreements in environmental policy. 
Most related works have analyzed collective action for management of common 
resources such as community forests (Poteet and Ostrom, 2003 and 2004; Agrawal, 
A.,  Yadama,  1997;  Gebremedhin,  et  al.,  2003)  or  analyze  the  determinants  of 
enactment of bylaws at the community level and compliance with these bylaws 
(Nkonya, E. et all, 2005). Knox and Meinzen -Dick (2001) analyze factors that 
contribute  to  effective  devolving  rights  to  resources  to  local  users  and  how 
property rights and collective action institutions can shape devolution outcomes. 
Community based management of natural resources and other forms of collective 
action  have  become  an  increasingly  acceptable  approach  for  environmental 
management.  
The approach of this paper stresses the vital role of collective action and other 
"major groups" in water resources conservation and sustainable development. Its 
role  was  recognized  in  Chapter  27[2]  of  Agenda  21,  leading  to  revised ERSA 2006 
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arrangements for consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations which are, indeed, collective voluntary action. 
 This paper addresses the motivations that drive participation in groups concerning 
water protection and provides a review of the key role collective action plays in 
accessing  and  managing  water  resources.  It  also  analyzes  the  conditions  and 
factors which make such organizations effective in solving shared problems and in 
faciliting and institutionalizing negotiation platforms.   
The coalition building capacity suggesting the mobilization of civil society in the 
sense  of  organized  interests  can  supplement  the  ultimate  responsibility  of  the 
traditional democratic institutions according to the implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention
1 Principles.  
Collective action heavily relies on the social capital existing in a community to 
accomplish  goals  and  objectives.  These  social  networks  allow  for  flow  of 
information, serving not only to criticize but also to purpose a different course in 
environmental and particularly, water management.  
Modern  governance  calls  for  consensus,  seeking  processes  with  organized 
interests, a good culture of consultation and participation. Collective action meets 
these goals, as offers the chances for environmental effectiveness, contributing to 
information generation and creation of relevant knowledge.  
Most problems with water resource management are felt at the lowest levels and 
changes in water management are required down to the individual action, reasons 
why  the  development  strategies  call  for  extensive  pro-active  participation  (at 
different levels, sectors and scales) upholding the principles of subsidiarity.  
The  first  section  briefly  reviews  collective  action  theory  and  conceptual 
framework.  Next,  some  notes  about  the  subsidiarity  principle  and  the  Aarhus 
                                                 
1 The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters adopted on 25
th June 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark, at the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference in the “Environment for Europe” process. 
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Convention  which  consubstantiate  the  role  of  collective  action  to  water 
governance, which is analyse  in third  section. 
 Finally,  this  paper  also  highlights  the  role  performed  by  collective  action  in 
increasing advocacy skills and capacity, contributing to strengthening governance 
at the local level through favoring the enabling environment for water protection 
and conservation. 
 
1- Water policy, the subsidiarity principle and the Aarhus Convention 
The  subsidiarity  principle  entered  into  the  constitutional  order  of  the  European 
Union through the Maastricht Treaty, but its foundation may be attributed to the 
social Encyclical Letter Quadrogesimo Anno of Pope Pius XI in 1931 translated in 
Emiliou (1992): “… Just as it is wrong to withdraw from individual and commit to 
a group what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is a injustice, 
a  grace  of  evil  and  a  disturbance  of  the  right  order,  for  a  larger  and  a  higher 
association to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by 
smaller and lower societies. This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, 
unshaken and unchangeable. Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity 
should be help members of a social body, but never to destroy or absorb them.” 
The catholic social teaching of Encyclical Letter is applicable to the organization 
of  a  state,  a  society,  a  municipality,  a  community  or  a  family,  which  seems  a 
concept  much  broader  than  that  of  Article  3b  of  the  Treaty  amended  on  7
th 
February 1992, addressed to the division of role and competences between the 
European Union and its Member States. As Millon- Delsol (1993), we believe that 
the  subsidiarity  principle  has  its  clearest  meaning  in  federal  organizations.  It 
provided the foundation for municipal autonomy but there are some provisions on 
subsidiarity in water policy in most of the Treaty Articles, either by indicating the 
respective roles, allocation of competences of the European Union and its Member 
States,  by  defining  to  what  an  extent  other  policies  have  a  subsidiary  function 
aiming the promotion of water policy objectives, by allowing for different degrees 
of harmonization and scope for action at national level. But, subsidiarity, although ERSA 2006 
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legally  established  with  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  was  indeed  explicit  in 
environmental policy since 1973, as the principle of the “appropriate level” listed 
in the First Environmental Action Programme: “In each category of pollution, it is 
necessary  to  establish  the  level  of  action  (local,  regional,  national,  community, 
international) best suited to the type of pollution and to the geographical zone to be 
protected”. The Programme combined the principle of subsidiarity with the wider 
concept  of  shared  responsibility,  which  involves  a  mixing  of  actors  and 
instruments at the appropriate levels, and is not restricted to the interface between 
the European Union and the Member States; rather, sectoral level, enterprises, the 
general public and consumers are explicitly mentioned. 
So, the subsidiarity principle was established not only as a formal allocation of 
competences  but  as  a  functional  guideline  to  increase  the  effectiveness  of 
environmental policy measures; and it could be seen in a broader sense, not only as 
a federal interpretation, namely to find a protected lack of restrictions of action for 
local and regional authorities according to Jacques Delors
2, but as the better way of 
achieving environmental policy success: the cooperation of all actors concerned. 
The  five  central  principles  of  environmental  policies  are  stated  in  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Community  as  amended  on  7
th  February  1992: 
“Community  policy  on  the  environment  shall  be  based  on  the  precautionary 
principle  and  on  the  principles  that  preventive  action  should  be  taken,  that 
environmental  damage  should  as  a  priority  be  rectified  at  source  and  that  the 
polluter  should  pay.  Environmental  protection  requirements  must  be  integrated 
into the definition and implementation of other Community policies”…  
The integration principle also applies to the protection of public health:”…Health 
protection requirements shall form a constituent part of the Community’s other 
policies.”  
European Environmental Policy shall take into account the diversity of situations 
of  the  various  regions  of  the  Union  according  to  the  Treaty  and  this  does  not 
collide with the emergence of collective action providing a public good that is its 
                                                 
2 In accordance with Elliott (1994 ) ERSA 2006 
Collective Action – a Challenge and an Opportunity for Water Governance 
 
M. Manuela Castro e Silva                                                               Porto School of Economics                                                                                    
 
7 
vital  role  in  changing  attitudes  and  cultures,  helping  to  pick  and  spread  the 
necessary knowledge for water protection and conservation.  
Water management has a multi- layered nature and not only the State but also 
many other non- state environmental managers can be identified, as environmental 
non governmental organizations, transnational corporations, international financial 
institutions,  local-level  environmental  managers  as  municipalities,  at  different 
levels  of  environmental  interaction,  being  often  different  in  terms  of  their  
motivations, interests or impact.   
The main objective of EU concerning water policies is well established in COM, 
(2000) where it is clear that the development of water pricing policies enhancing 
the sustainability of water resources is crucial. The idea is that the full recovery of 
financial costs and the integration of environmental concerns are the favorite way 
to use efficiently water, as pricing policies contribute to meeting the environmental 
objectives in a cost effective way. 
European Water Framework Directive
3 (WFD) includes for the first time and in an 
explicit way, economic concepts in water management and although being very 
flexible about specific methodologies of implementation in each member state, it 
gives  a  special  importance  to  the  economic  analysis  of  the  water  sector.  So, 
although each Member State could adapt the principles concerning this matter to 
their  own  law,  they  had  to  try  to  comply  with  the  precautionary  principle,  the 
polluter pays principle and the corrective principle of environmental damage at the 
source besides safe minimum standards. 
Water  Directive  establishes  a  system  for  promoting  the  sustainable  water  use, 
protection of European Union water resources and ecosystems, safeguard of future 
water  uses  and  also  specify  that  Member-States  must  encourage  public 
participation in the implementation of the  Directive which means  a call for an 
integrated water resources management. This concept was already recognized in 
the Rio Declaration, to a large extent based on the Dublin Principles developed 
                                                 
3 (Directive 2000/60/CE) in http://www.inag.pt 
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earlier that year. For that, and in sequence of the application of the subsidiarity 
principle in the functional sense to the issue of allocating decision-making power 
to the various levels in water policy, this resource should be managed in a basin 
context, under the principles of good governance and public participation (Maia 
2006). 
The idea of citizen’s participation in environmental issues and the need for access 
to information on the environment held by public authorities is stressed in principle 
10  of  the  Rio  Declaration  (Agenda  21)  and  the  Aarhus  Convention.  This 
Convention  is  an  environmental  agreement  linking  human  and  environmental 
rights  focusing  the  interaction  between  the  public  and  public  authorities  in  a 
democratic context and appealing to government transparency, accountability and 
responsiveness. It recognizes that in the field of the environment “improved access 
to information and public participation in decision making enhance the quality and 
the implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental 
issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public 
authorities  to  take    due  account  of  such  concerns…and  the  importance  of  the 
respective roles that individual citizens, non-governmental organisations and the 
private sector can play in environmental protection”. 
It  is  a  new  ethical  approach  supporting  that  sustainable  development  can  be 
achieved only with the proactive participation of all stakeholders. This is a bottom-
up strategy, a complementary approach of the subsidiarity principle, calling for 
institutional mobilisation and coordination, ecological skilfulness and perceptual 
change. 
Subsidiarity  confers  legitimacy  to  any  level  capable  of  fulfilling  specific  water 
management functions. But since these functions need to be coordinated  with one 
another, with other environmental policy measures, and with other policy areas, 
functional legitimacy must be highest for institutions and mechanisms faciliting 
such coordination.  
Decentralization, especially concerning water distribution to consumers, makes it 
easier to ensure financial autonomy and the involvement of the private sector and 
water  users  in  water  management  by  means  of  smaller,  locally  managed ERSA 2006 
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institutions,  whether  public  or  private,  may  open  up  new  sources  of  financing, 
especially where central government transfers are no longer possible. Besides, they 
have  more  effective  authority  to  charge  and  collect  fees  and  more  freedom  to 
manage without political interference. 
The cause of human liberty is best served by a minimum of command and control 
centralized government and, if compulsion is necessary, local and decentralized 
authority is more acceptable than a centralized source of power. On the grounds of 
efficiency, we also believe that the more nearly the costs and benefits of water 
projects are brought home to those that make the decisions, the more correct those 
decisions will likely to be. The spillover effects, which are the crucial defect of 
private  and  local  decision-making,  may  be  partly  remediable  through  a  more 
appropriate definition of property rights to coincide with the span of the decisions 
involved. 
Side by side, stakeholder participation in water management potentially assist the 
growth  of  environmental  awareness,  empower  the  public  in  participating  in 
environmental decision-making which has served to incorporate local knowledge 
and  circumstances  leading  to  better  compliance  with  pollution  prevention  and 
efficient water use. It is a complementary approach to environmental education and 
to education for environment and sustainability, helping to built local capacity, 
encourages  greater  cost  sharing  and  enhance  transparency  and  institutional 
performance. 
 
2-An overview of collective action theory and conceptual framework 
Central problem to collective action according to Olson (1971) is to foresee which 
are the conditions to be fulfilled in order to achieving that one or some members of 
a group have incentive  to act voluntary on behalf of all members, providing a 
shared interest ( non-excludable benefits) with the characteristic of a public good. 
It is costly to develop institutions to exclude potential beneficiaries from it and it 
has benefits to all members, even to those not participating for the provision of the ERSA 2006 
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good.  The  successful  provision  of  that  public  good  requires  the  voluntary 
participation of a critical number of individuals.  
Most definitions of collective action involve a group of people with shared interest 
and common action. A briefly notion is put forward by (Sander, 1992) to whom 
collective  action  will  occur  when  more  than  one  individual  willingly agrees  to 
contribute to an effort in order to achieve an outcome. 
Olson  (1971),  page  50, made  a  distinction  between  privilege,  intermediate  and 
latent groups as follows: 
“A ´privilege` group is a group such that each of its members, or at least 
some of them, has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided, 
even if he has to bear the full burden of providing it himself. In such a 
group there is the presumption that collective good will be obtained, and it 
may  be  obtained  without  any  group  organization  or  coordination 
whatever. 
“An ´ intermediate` group is a group which no single member gets a share 
of  the  benefit  sufficient  to  give  him  an  incentive  to  provide  the  good 
himself, but which does not have so many members that no one member 
will  notice  that  any  other  member  is  or  is  not  helping  to  provide  the 
collective good. In such a group a collective good may, or equally well 
may not, be obtained, but no collective good may ever be obtained without 
some group coordination or organization.” 
“A ´latent group` is distinguished by the fact that, if one member does or 
does not help provide the collective good, no other one member will be 
significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react.” 
Groups  empower  individuals  and  allows  them  to  better  cope  with  risks  and 
provides a net benefit that most governments and the private sector do not ( Place 
et  al  2002);  they  also  allow  for  flow  of  information  and  facilitates  access  to 
resources that otherwise  would be difficult to achieve. They may strengthen the ERSA 2006 
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bargaining  power,  which  calls  for  its  importance  for  disadvantaged  community 
interest groups, sharing information and accomplishing common goals. 
 Following the approach of Myatt and Wallace (2005), the success of an organized 
group which they call “ team” depends upon the costs and the benefits involved; 
the variability and correlation payoffs; the team size crucial for success; the return 
of  any  excessive  or  unused  contributions,  and  the  set  of  potential  contributors. 
Collective action is easiest when the  average  contribution costs is low and the 
average  value  placed  on  the  public  good  is  high.  Besides,  negative  correlation 
between costs and benefits tends to undermine the stability of the team, while a 
positive correlation enhances the stability of a successful collective action.  
As regards the team size, the authors noticed that, ceteris paribus, the larger the 
teams, the more difficult to organize it; but on the other hand, it may enhance 
individual benefits from a higher- value public good and consequently, reinforcing 
team stability. 
They find that despite of the free riding behavior- which want to benefit  with the 
provision  of  the  public  good  without  bearing  the  respective  costs  -,  there  are 
incentives  to  participate  in  a  collective  action.  Free  riding  does  not  undermine 
collective action, even in large groups, although it may generate an efficiency loss 
as it can increase the costs of providing a fixed level of public good according to 
Dawson and Segerson (2003).  
Werner  et  al  (1994)  observe  that  the  free  rider  incentives  do  not  destroy  the 
viability  of  successfully  collective  action  although  it  generates  a  gain  for  both 
participants and not participants in the team. Nevertheless, Pereira (1996), Olson 
(1971), Sandler (1992) among other authors, note that the free riding behavior may 
undermine  the  collective  action  since  there  will  be  an  under-  provision  of  the 
public good. 
Drawing heavily on Sandler (1992) that summarize Olson(1971) book, three main 
issues may  have an influence on collective action outcomes: ERSA 2006 
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1-Group size may be a root cause of collective failure. Large groups tend to be 
pure latent groups as they may not provide themselves with the “shared interest”, 
the collective good. Besides, no individual or coalition within the group fulfills the 
conditions of being a privilege group. 
 Large groups turn down the probability of members meet and know each other; 
transaction costs of organizing collective action are greater; each member supports 
a smaller share of costs and it is more difficult to distinguish contributors and not 
contributors  for  the  collective  good.  Voluntary  provision  of  the  good  in  this 
context may not be feasible due to the free rider behaviour of individuals.(Olson 
1971).Ceteris  paribus,  the  larger  the  group,  the  greater  the  probability  of  free-
riding, the more suboptimal is the equilibrium.  
2-  Collective  action  failure  may  be  related  with  group  asymmetry  concerning 
individual’s taste and/or endowments. These groups tend to be privilege ones; and 
larger members, with greater endowments will “bear a disproportionate burden of 
collective provision”.  
3- Institutional design and selective incentives- giving private, excludable benefit 
inducements to contributors- beyond the provision of the collective good for all 
members of the group may overcome collective failure in large groups. 
According to standard economic theory (Olson 1971), all individuals are assumed 
to have a perfect free rider predisposition, which is based rather on the rationality 
principle than on egoism assumption and tend to be the more prevalent behaviour, 
the larger the group is. But sometimes members of a group voluntary reveal the 
true willingness to pay for the specific public good, which means this behaviour 
may be overestimated in economic theory. 
 Ostrom (1990) analysed that under specific institutional settings, people did not 
adopt  complete  free  rider  behaviour  and  did  not  overexploited  the  common 
property resources.  
Werner  et  al  (1994)  analysed  the  case  of  the  provision  of  a  public  good-  the 
prevention of a public bad- , which was totally left to the citizens´ bargaining, ERSA 2006 
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related with a construction of an incinerator. They realized that not only the ease of 
organizing but also the size of the stakes plays an important role on collective 
action. Results of these authors are not consistent with the neoclassical assumption 
of generalized free riding.  
Sociological factors may  affect citizens´ decision to contribute. “The longer an 
individual has been a member of a community, the stronger the perceived pressure 
to participate in collective actions.” Werner et al (1994)  
Ceteris paribus, formal and informal determinants of embeddedness will strengthen 
individual’s  incentives  to  participate  for  the  provision  of  a  public  good  and 
attitudinal factors may  change people’s willingness to pay. Altruist preferences 
cause people to behave in a non egoistic manner. Although traditional neoclassical 
approach to human behaviour provides evidence of free riding behaviour, even 
large groups may overcome this behaviour due to motives that are rooted in the 
social network, according to Werner et al (1994).  
The value attributed to the “shared interest”, the expectation of improving their 
livelihoods, the easier way of accessing resources, the power relations within the 
group may also shape collective action outcomes. 
Some groups may represent strategic alliances that have a clear function to capture 
the attention of the public and politicians on a chosen subject. 
The emergence of civil society organisations such as environmental NGOs (non 
governmental organisations) according to Guéguen (2006) are horizontal coalitions 
which bring together producers, consumers, and environmentalists across the all 
spectrum of a products chain and represent a lobbying of tomorrow.  
Environmental NGO´ have won huge technical credibility and they are perfectly in 
control of their dossiers which constitute a factor of influence and symbolise pro-
active  participation  to  facilitate  the  discover  of  points  of  convergence  and  the 
emergence of pre-negotiated solutions rather than opposing the process or slowing 
it down; these competences bring to the political arena the usefulness of horizontal 
coalitions.  NGOs  are  crucial  to  increase  representativeness,  as  it  is  possible  to ERSA 2006 
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speak in the name of shared interests. The World Bank defines NGOs as “private 
organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interest of the 
poor,  protect  the  environment,  provide  basic  social  services,  or  undertake 
community development” (Operational Directive 14.70).  
Although these organisations have become increasingly professionalized over the 
last  decades,  principles  of  voluntarism  and  altruism  remain  their  key  defining 
characteristics which mean that the free rider incentives are not enough to destroy 
the viability of successfully collective action. 
 
3 - Contribution of collective action to water governance 
Governance arises as a matter of public concern whenever the members of a social 
group understand that they are interdependent as the actions of each individual 
member influence the welfare of the others. Interdependence gives rise to conflict 
when the way an individual tries to achieve his goals interfere in or even collide 
with the efforts of others to pursue their own goals. But cooperation may emerge, 
when  opportunities  arise  to  enhance  social  welfare  by  acting  to  coordinate  the 
activities  of  the  individual  members  of  the  group.  Interdependence  induces 
interactive  decision-making  but  also  may  generate  the  potential  for  collective 
action problems as citizens may suffer joint losses originated by conflicts, or fail to 
gather joint gains due to an inability to cooperate (Olson 1971, Hardin 1982). 
Governance  systems  or  social  institutions  in  opposite  to  organizations  or 
governments, may resolve collective action problems. We suggest that groups can 
succeed in handling the function of governance without resorting to the creation of 
conventional governments.  Governance involves the establishment and operation 
of social institutions, a set of procedures, rules, to guideline social practices which 
can resolve social conflicts, enhance social welfare and mitigate collective action 
problems (Young 1994).  
Concerning  water,  governance  refers  to  the  range  of  institutional  systems  at 
political,  social,  economic,  and  administrative  level  which  consubstantiate  the ERSA 2006 
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conservation, development and management of water resources and the delivery of 
water services to society. It compromises the processes, and institutions through 
which  all  involved  stakeholders,  articulate  coherently  their  priorities,  guideline 
their  obligations,  exercise  their  legal  rights,  and  conciliate,  if  possible,  their 
differences. As referred in the document Towards Water Security: A Framework 
for Action (GWP 2000), "the water crisis is often a crisis of governance: a failure 
to integrate policies and practices related to the management of water resources. 
Good  water  governance  exists  where  government  bodies  responsible  for  water 
establish an effective policy and legal framework to allocate and manage water 
resources in ways responsive to national, social and economic needs and to the 
long-term sustainability of the resource base". The same is valid for international, 
sub-national and local levels. 
 The challenge of sustainability and the crisis of the supply side strategies – due to 
unsustainability, new governance requirements and lack of economic rationality of 
the most present large-scale hydraulic projects - make clear that we need to change 
the water governance strategy. There are new governance requirements based on 
understanding  and  co-evolving  with  nature  in  an  interdisciplinary  and  holistic 
approach, towards transparency, citizen’s involvement and proactive participation 
of stakeholders according to Aarhus principles. 
The immediate effect of economic measures to restrain non-ecological practices in 
our present system is to bring about a sharp rise in the prices of much kind of 
goods, which may mean in the long run, if there is no change in the pattern of 
consumer´ preferences, a fall in the standard of living of those who use them. But 
pricing is not the unique instrument that will solve water resources pollution and 
other problems elsewhere.  
Certainly pricing strategies promote more efficient and less polluting use of water. 
It can avoid overexploitation and degradation of water resources. We don’t have 
yet  precise  information  on  the  impact  of  pricing  on  the  physical  environment 
although  the  demonstrable  impact  on  water  demand  for  different  uses  and 
consequently the reduction of pressure on water resources (COM 2000). It can 
ensure  that  infrastructures  are  adequately  design  and  that  enough  financial ERSA 2006 
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resources  are  collected  for  maintaining  and  renewing  infrastructures;  but 
application of economic and environmental principles in water pricing policies is 
limited in much circumstances, namely in developing countries, for low-income 
groups  and  some  rural  and  farming  communities,  mainly  as  a  result  of 
affordability
4and social concerns. Besides, command and control schemes created 
enmity  between  the  local  people  and  the  authorities  without  achieving  great 
success. 
On the other hand, conflict and competition over water has been increasing and the 
particularity is that water problems are in first instance social problems rather than 
technological  ones,  and  can  be  the  major  limiting  factor  in  socio-economic 
development, as it was already noted at the 1
st World Water Forum
5 in 1997. So, 
the  challenge  is  finding  the  pathway  from  potential  conflicts  to  cooperation 
potential  as all activities relating to water management must harmonise with one 
another, since the natural water cycle is indivisible not only in geographical but 
also in the functional sense as OECD(1989) stresses. 
 The  wise  use  of  water  resources  and  the  regulation  of  water  management 
functions require that they be considered as an interrelated system since they are 
part of a complex of natural resources. Further, they have to be based upon natural 
ecological  issues,  considering  the  relationships  among  ecosystems  depending 
directly  or  indirectly  on  water,  rather  than  upon  social  or  political  factors,  but 
without ignoring them once they can be unable factors for sustainability.  
Environmental  non  governmental  organisations  will  have  and  shall  have  a 
worthwhile role in this context and may also see European environmental law as a 
source  of  intervention  potential.  Cooperation  may  be  an  important  factor  in 
understanding the politics of water management, although such cooperation may 
be  a  part  of  conflict  over  water  resources  in  as  much  as  water  managers  join 
together  to  fight  over  who  must  control  water  management  in  a  given  area. 
Nevertheless, the benefit stream of cooperation seems to outweigh these costs as 
we believe it is an assertive way to promote a broader consensus among competing 
                                                 
4 Affordability is defined as the relative importance of water service costs in users’ disposable 
income, either on average of for low-income users only (COM 2000). 
5 UN GA special session 1, Marrakesh. ERSA 2006 
Collective Action – a Challenge and an Opportunity for Water Governance 
 
M. Manuela Castro e Silva                                                               Porto School of Economics                                                                                    
 
17 
environmental  managers and  stakeholders,  which  is  to  serve  as  the  basis  for  a 
resolution of almost all outstanding differences. 
How to put water in the minds of people? It is the answer to that question that must 
be crucial in the political debate about water policies, as remember Vlachos 2006. 
Indeed, the key issue is to understand that efficacy and not only efficiency must be 
the challenge in order to guarantee the access to safe water to everybody all over 
the world as human right.  
Easy problems can be solved by market and political system, but hard problems 
have a different path. Conflict prevention and management relying on water and 
water  systems  is  not  enough  today;  the  rising  of  a  social  competence  to  deal 
peacefully with conflicts, a coherent set of rules to guide decentralized decision-
making need to be encouraged.  
For success, we must interact with economists, politicians, scientists, ecologists, 
economists and spiritual leaders and mainly, with the citizens, in a “ let’s work 
together” approach as a propelling force to generate a balance between water for 
livelihood and water as a resource. 
Collective action shall have an important role in the new approach of participatory 
governance, at communication and information level, although the State often has 
a  considerable  informational  advantage  over  non  governmental  environmental 
organisations, which constitute a potentially powerful means to map, measure and 
manipulate people and the environment (Pretty 1995, Breyman 1993).  
Collective action may contribute for the effectiveness of water pricing policy for 
all the water services including the environment, besides contributing to a deeper 
understanding of the underlying differences in institutional economical and social 
context, understanding of spatial interactions and stimulating a change in attitude 
towards improving environmentally sensitive areas and striving a shift from the 
state as protector to the group as steward.  
Perhaps  more  relevant,  these  organizations  draw  media  attention  to  otherwise 
neglected  local  environmental  conflicts.  Such  media  attention  surely  forces ERSA 2006 
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ostensibly more powerful stakeholders to justify their practices on the grounds of 
sustainable development and social justice. 
As it was already stressed, bottom-up proactive participation of stakeholders and 
all citizens is required by WFD. This approach to environmental policies achieved 
through public participation and transparency is fundamental and contributes to 
increasing the chances of successful implementation, facilitates the acceptance of 
new  charging  schemes  by  users,  besides  making  these  policies  politically  and 
socially acceptable and providing valuable information about potential impact of 
pricing policies.  
The involvement of users and stakeholders can take varying  forms, since river 
basin committees, regional consumer services committees, consumers associations, 
environmental associations which can be involved in the setting of water prices, 
raising  citizens’  awareness  of  environmental  problems  and  their  understanding 
about the role they have to play for the eco-social sustainability. The effects of the 
decision  to  live  ecologically  shall  deeply  alter  the  balance  of  individual’s 
preferences.  In  fact,  goods  regarded  as  symbols  of  status  will  become  socially 
proscribed and the pattern of life may be so altered that it will be possible the 
rising of a new demand for new types of commodities and an economic effort to 
meet these needs which can lead to more equitable and sustainable outcomes and 
may enhance the welfare of real world despite of environmental constraints. 
There is also a great deal of interest  the developing of collective action as it can 
overcome imperfections of  governments, of markets and of local collectives in 
environmental  conservation,  watershed  protection,  biodiversity  conservation 
issues. But these factors, all at once, may be constraints or facilitating factors in the 
developing collective action. 
 Community  based  natural  resource  management  is  increasingly  becoming  an 
important approach for addressing natural resources degradation in low income 
countries.   According to Nkonya, E. et all (2005) econometric analysis of survey 
data,  there  are  factors  that  are  associated  with  enactment  of  local  bylaws  and 
awareness of and compliance with natural resources management requirements:  
people are more likely to comply with a bylaw enacted by the local council than ERSA 2006 
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otherwise, which justify the subsidiary principle ; the research also enhances the 
strong  association  between  awareness  and  compliance  with  natural  resources 
management bylaws and the need to promote environmental education as a part of 
the strategy to increase compliance. Awareness is enhanced if roads environmental 
education  in  schools,  resource  seminars,  brochures  and  district  level  training 
workshops. 
 Devolution  of  responsibility  contributes  to  greater  compliance  with  natural 
resources management requirements, as it is greater with bylaws enacted by local 
councils than with laws enacted at a higher level. In this context, collective action 
may bridge the gap between citizens and government, may support and promote 
the  cooperation  of  interested  individuals  and  entities  in  creating  a  suitable  and 
feasible  institutional  framework  for  solving  natural  resources  and  particularly 
water resources problems. 
 
4 -Conclusion 
This paper tries to identify the conditions under which individuals are likely to be 
able to participate in collective action schemes and how it can be used to overcome 
transaction costs and barriers to participation in solving water resources problems. 
 Sociological  factors  may  affect  citizens´  decision  to  participate  in  collective 
action. The value attributed to the “shared interest”, the expectation of improving 
their livelihoods, the easier way of accessing resources, the power relations within 
the  group  may  shape  collective  action  outcomes  despite  the  existence  of  free 
riders. We observed that under specific institutional settings, people did not adopt 
complete free rider behaviour, as foreseen by economic theory. 
The developing of collective action may be a way to overcome imperfections of 
governments, of markets and of local collectives in environmental conservation, 
watershed  protection  and  biodiversity  conservation  issues.  Allies  are  crucial  to 
increase  representativeness,  as  it  is  possible  to  speak  in  the  name  of  shared 
interests. Organised groups may strengthen the bargaining power, which calls for ERSA 2006 
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its importance for disadvantaged community interest groups, sharing information 
and  accomplishing  common  goals.  Collective  action  also  allow  for  flow  of 
information and facilitates access to resources that otherwise would be difficult to 
achieve. 
Environmental collective action may potentially assist the growth of environmental 
awareness,  promote  an  active  engagement  of  citizens  towards  a  proactive 
participation and they are capable of bringing the interest of people to issues that 
do not directly interfere with day to day life. Besides, they catalyze the public 
opinion and influence the political agenda for crucial issues, bringing to managers 
and politics the feeling about the gains with empowering people in participating in 
environmental decision-making, which serves to incorporate local knowledge and 
circumstances leading to better compliance with pollution prevention and efficient 
water use. 
Collective  action  contributes  to  raising  citizens’  awareness  of  environmental 
problems and their understanding about the role they have to play for the eco-
social  sustainability  Perhaps  more  relevant,  these  organizations  draw  media 
attention to otherwise neglected local environmental conflicts. 
These factors may relieve the legislator, affecting the way in which powers are 
exercised  at  European  level,  particularly  as  regards  the  five  principles  of  good 
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